Richard B. Russell, Jr. Collection
1840-1978, with gaps; bulk (1932-1971)
3,565 boxes, 1,818 linear feet
16 microfilm reels
|
|
|
|
 |
ADMINISTRATIVE INFORMATION
Access Restrictions: Case mail is closed and items in Exhibit B and Cross-Reference Copies are restricted.
User Restrictions: Library acts as “fair use” reproduction agent.
Processing Notes:
Copyright Information: Before material from collections at the Richard B. Russell Library may be quoted in print, or otherwise reproduced, in whole or in part, in any publication, permission must be obtained from (1) the owner of the physical property, and (2) the holder of the copyright. It is the particular responsibility of the researcher to obtain both sets of permission. Persons wishing to quote from materials in the Russell Library collection should consult the Director. Reproduction of any item must contain a complete citation to the original. The Estate of the late Richard B. Russell, Jr. retains his intellectual property rights wherever they exist. Contact the library director.
Preferred Citation: Richard B. Russell, Jr. Collection, Richard B. Russell Library for Political Research and Studies, The University of Georgia Libraries, Athens, Georgia.
Back to Top
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTE:
Behind the Scenes Leadership: Richard B. Russell, Jr.
by Robert C. Byrd
The following speech was delivered by Senator Robert C. Byrd on the floor of the United States Senate on 1 February 1988 and printed in the Congressional Record, Vol. 134, Part 1, pp. 499-509.
Mr. President, in my continuing series of addresses on the history of the United States Senate, I have focused from time to time on individual senators who have left their mark on this institution. One such senator is Richard Brevard Russell, Jr., of Georgia. In 1972, I initiated legislation that provided for naming the original Senate office building in his honor. Today, the thousands of people who work on Capitol Hill know his name, but only a few know his legacy.
In preparing these remarks, I have had the good fortune to be ably assisted by Dr. Gilbert Fite. Dr. Fite served from 1976 to 1986 as the first Richard B. Russell professor of American history at the University of Georgia. From 1945 to 1971, he was a member of the history faculty at the University of Oklahoma, and, from 1971 to 1976, he served as president of Eastern Illinois University. Dr. Fite's research interests are reflected in the professional associations of which he has been president. They include the Western History Association, the Southern Historical Association, and the Agricultural History Society. This distinguished scholar is currently completing a full-scale biography of Senator Russell.
Richard B. Russell, Jr., was one of the nation's leading statesmen in twentieth century America. A true son of the South, he served in the United States Senate from January 12, 1933, until his death on January 21, 1971, some thirty-eight years later. During that period, he worked with six presidents, and, from the 1940's when he emerged as a leader in the Senate, he played a major role in national policymaking. His career spanned epochal events, including the Great Depression, World War II, the introduction of nuclear power, the Korean and Vietnam wars, the battle for civil rights, expansion of federal powers and responsibilities, and a host of other major developments. His mark can be found on most of the great questions that faced the country during his terms in Washington.
In 1963, a reporter for Newsweek magazine described Senator Russell as:
a courtly, soft-spoken, cultural patrician, whose aides and associates treat him with deferential awe. Modest, even shy, in manner, devastatingly skilled in debate, he has a brilliant mind, encyclopedic learning, unrivaled access to pressure points of senatorial power and a gift for using them. He is a senator's senator, the head of the Senate establishment, the most influential member of the United States Senate.
Who was this man who had won such respect and power? What manner of man was he?
Richard Russell was born in the small town of Winder, Georgia, some forty miles northeast of Atlanta, on November 2, 1897. He was the fourth child and first son of thirteen living children of Judge Richard B. Russell and Ina Dillard Russell. He was born into a distinguished and well-educated family whose roots went back to colonial times. His Russell ancestors had lived in South Carolina and Georgia for several generations and were successful planters and businessmen. Russell's grandmother, Rebecca Harriette Brumby, had descended from the Brumbys and the Brevards, two prominent South Carolina and North Carolina families. On both sides, it was a family of modest wealth and prestige.
Richard Brevard Russell, the senator's father, was born at Marietta, Georgia, in 1859. He attended the University of Georgia, receiving a law degree in 1880. He practiced law in Athens; he was elected in 1882 to the Georgia house of representatives, where he served for six years; and, in 1888, he was elected solicitor general of the western judicial circuit of Georgia. He held that position until January 1, 1899, when he became judge of the superior court of the western judicial circuit.
Judge Russell was an intensely ambitious man. In 1904, he made an unsuccessful race for chief justice of the Georgia supreme court, and, two years later, he entered the campaign for governor against the prominent Hoke Smith, a contest in which he was decisively defeated. In 1911, the elder Russell failed again in a race for the governorship and had no better success when he ran for Congress in 1916. In 1922, however, he won a campaign for chief justice of the Georgia supreme court, a position that he held until his death in 1938.
Young Richard B. Russell, Jr., therefore, grew up in a large family that was prominent and widely known throughout the state. It was also a family that expected the children to achieve. Judge Russell believed deeply in at least three things-education, hard work, and personal ambition. Moreover, he had special ambitions for his first son and namesake. Both Judge and Mrs. Russell expected their eldest son to become a leader in some field, preferably public service.
To help achieve that goal, the Russells sent young Richard to Gordon Military Institute at Barnesville, Georgia. This was considered the best secondary school in the state, and one of the top such institutions in the South. It attracted students from many of Georgia's leading families, and Judge Russell believed that the contacts his son made there among fellow students would later be helpful in a political career. Therefore, in September 1911, at the age of thirteen, young Richard set off for Gordon.
Although he possessed high native intelligence, he did not take his school work very seriously. He was much more attracted to the social life, both on and off campus. Despite intense urgings from his father and mother to study hard, he so neglected his studies that he nearly flunked out of school. Judge Russell, hoping to stimulate his son by appealing to family pride, once wrote, "You carry my name, and I want you to carry it higher than I have done or can do in my few remaining years." Such fatherly urgings, however, were largely in vain.
At the end of his sophomore year, Richard had passed all of his courses except Latin. Believing that a different environment might help his son, Judge Russell decided to send him to the Seventh District A & M School near Marietta. There, the curriculum was less rigorous, and students had to work for part of their expenses. Richard's father believed that a work schedule might provide the discipline needed to do better academic work. During that year, Richard did improve in his studies, and, after making up his failed Latin course at a University of Georgia summer session, he returned to Gordon and graduated with his class in May 1915. It was a close call, however, whether he would meet the requirements for graduation. He declared years later that "more through grace and pity than through knowledge," his teacher had given him a passing mark in calculus . Up to that time, Richard had clearly failed to meet his parents' expectations in his school work, although, just as his father had planned, he had made many friends who later were important in his rise to political power in Georgia.
In September 1915, Richard entered the University of Georgia Law School in Athens, some twenty miles east of his home in Winder. While he continued to be active socially, courting several young ladies, joining the Sigma Alpha Epsilon fraternity, and going to many parties and dances, he finally began to take his studies seriously. He did well in his law courses. Even though he was seriously ill and out of school for part of 1916, he received his law degree in 1918. Shortly after graduation, and only months before the armistice, he signed up for duty in the navy but did not leave Georgia during his seventy-nine days of service. He was proud of his service, however, and became an active member in the American Legion.
Russell was an avid reader in many fields, but history was his favorite subject. His paramount interest was the history of the Civil War, and, over the years, he became an authority on all aspects of that bloody conflict. Moreover, he believed that history had lessons for those who would learn from it, and considered it useful in policy-making decisions.
After being discharged from military service in December 1918, Russell returned home to Winder, moved in with his parents, and joined his father in the practice of law. A small-town law business, however, failed to satisfy the growing ambitions of this popular young man. In 1920, he decided to run for the Georgia house of representatives. Entering the campaign against a veteran legislator, Russell went from house to house seeking political support. He defeated his opponent nearly two to one. When he took his seat in the general assembly in 1921, he was twenty-three years old and one of the youngest men ever to serve in the Georgia legislature.
In Atlanta, he quickly became aligned with a group of so-called "young turks"who were trying to reduce the control of special interests in state government and advance a more progressive program. This group strongly favored improving the state's public education and building hard-surfaced highways. Education and good roads, Russell said, were the twin pathways to progress and modernization. On most issues, he was moderately progressive.
Early in his political career, he developed the tactics and techniques that served him well throughout his half-century of leadership. He carefully cultivated key people who would support him, many of whom were his former classmates at Gordon Military Institute and the University of Georgia. Secondly, he made it a point to know all the rules, regulations, and traditions of the legislature and, later, of the United States Senate. Knowledge, Russell rightly believed, was power, and he usually had more information than most other legislators. He also had a knack for political strategy, and he paid close attention to the interests of other legislators. He was also skillful in identifying the popular issues of the day and making them his own. Furthermore, he early developed the practice of working behind the scenes where he could arrange compromises that satisfied conflicting interests. Finally, he believed that a political leader must be absolutely honest, straightforward, and fair to all people and points of view.
Working on these principles, Russell, despite his youth, advanced rapidly in the Georgia House of Representatives. In 1924, with the support of the younger and more progressive crowd, he was elected speaker pro tem. In 1927, he was unanimously elected speaker of the house, and he was reelected in 1929. During his ten years in the general assembly, four of them as speaker of the house, he worked hard to improve education and to build more and better highways. He insisted on a fiscally responsible, pay-as-you-go policy to fund these programs. He also became a strong backer of reorganizing the state government in order to achieve greater efficiency.
By 1930, at age thirty-two, Russell was emerging as one of Georgia's major political leaders. He was especially popular among legislators and ordinary people who believed that state government had been operated too much on behalf of the special interests. In April 1930, he announced that he would run for governor on a platform of putting state government on a "business basis" and promising that he would head "an honest and economical administration." Initially, veteran politicians did not think that this young upstart had any chance in a field of seasoned candidates. Russell, however, canvassed the state from one end to the other, visiting thousands of voters in their homes and at village crossroads. In this grassroots campaign, he presented himself as the people's candidate and sharply attacked the special interests. He was an excellent speaker and debater. He devastated his opponents with superior knowledge, logic, common sense, and, when necessary, with ridicule and wit. Georgians responded to his call for honesty, efficiency, and fairness in government and elected him by the overwhelming vote of 99,505 to 47,157 for his opponent.
Russell took his oath as governor in June 1931, during the depths of the Great Depression. In his inaugural address, he promised to balance the state budget and to liquidate Georgia's debts. He emphasized that even the poorest students, especially rural youth, must be given the opportunity for an education and that a state-funded highway system must be developed. He also stressed the need for governmental reorganization. During the eighteen months that he served as governor, his greatest achievement was reorganizing Georgia's government. More than one hundred boards, commissions, and departments were consolidated into eighteen new state agencies. One of the most successful examples of that reorganization was the establishment of the University System of Georgia for higher education, which placed a single governing board over all of the state's colleges and universities.
While it was assumed that Russell would run for a second term and be easily reelected, the death of United States Senator William J. Harris in April 1932 opened up an opportunity for Russell to enter national politics. On April 25, 1932, he announced that he would seek election to Senator Harris' unexpired term, which ran until 1937. At the same time, he appointed John S. Cohen, publisher of the Atlanta Journal, to serve until the election of Harris' successor.
A short time later, a veteran Georgia member of the U.S. House of Representatives, Charles R. Crisp, announced that he would seek the Senate seat. The Russell-Crisp campaign turned out to be long and bitter. Russell attacked Crisp's record in Washington and successfully identified him with the ruinous policies that had led to the Great Depression. He also accused Crisp of being aligned with the "power trust" and other representatives of "special privilege." In contrast, Russell presented himself as being "the champion of the masses." He did have the support of most farmers and of organized labor, and he spoke in every part of the state and aired his views in radio talks. His personal friends, once again, did yeoman service on his behalf. Despite most early predictions that he could not defeat Crisp, and opposition from many major newspapers including the Atlanta Constitution, Russell decisively whipped Crisp by winning some 58 percent of the popular vote and getting a higher percentage of the county unit votes.
During the summer, Russell had taken time off from campaigning to serve as a delegate to the Democratic National Convention. He was a strong supporter of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Russell had become acquainted with Roosevelt in the 1920's when the New Yorker spent time at Warm Springs, Georgia, and they also had several meetings when they served as governors of their respective states. At the convention, Russell made one of the seconding speeches for Roosevelt, urging the delegates to nominate him because he was free from the "predatory interests who have long fattened at the trough of special privilege." Roosevelt, Russell declared, would be a great leader because he understood and sympathized with the problems of ordinary people. He saw himself and Roosevelt as favoring many of the same things. He viewed Roosevelt, too, as the man who could best lead the country out of the depression. Roosevelt's election thrilled Russell, and he was excited about the prospect of working with the new president.
Richard Russell, at age thirty-five, was sworn in on January 12, 1933, as the youngest member of the United States Senate. Thanks to the arranged resignation of Senator Cohen, which permitted Russell to take office in January, he gained seniority over those newly elected senators who, in those days prior to the ratification of the Twentieth Amendment, would take their seats on March 4. A bachelor-some said one of Washington's most eligible young men-Russell moved into the Hamilton Hotel and began his long career in Washington.
Knowing that the Senate did its important work in committee, Russell actively sought an assignment to the Appropriations Committee. Senate Majority Leader Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas tried to explain to him that appointment to the Appropriations Committee was customarily reserved for senators with more experience and seniority. Of course, Russell knew this, but he persisted. Finally, because of some unfounded rumors that Russell might join a coalition with Senator Huey P. Long of Louisiana, whom the leadership viewed as a troublemaker, his request for appointment to the committee was honored. He was also named to the Naval Affairs, Immigration, and Manufactures committees. A short time later, he became chairman of the subcommittee on agricultural appropriations, which placed him in a key position to help farmers, a group for whose plight he had deep sympathy.
Russell enthusiastically supported most of the early New Deal legislation. He voted for the Agricultural Adjustment Act, the Tennessee Valley Authority, the National Recovery Act, and relief legislation. Moreover, as opposition developed to Roosevelt in 1935 and 1936, Russell became one of the president's strongest defenders. He sharply criticized those who accused Roosevelt of being a dictator, insisting that the president was leading the country in a peaceful and constructive revolution. While Russell believed firmly in private initiative and a capitalistic economy, he argued that the system had been taken off course by special, predatory, economic interests. The federal government must now intervene, he argued, to right the wrongs and help the common people.
During his early years in Washington, Richard Russell made an intensive study of the Senate rules, traditions, customs, and precedents. By the end of the 1930's, there was no better-informed senator on the procedures and operations of this body. His knowledge came from hours of reading and study. It was said that he read the entire Congressional Record every day. Since Russell never married, he had no family responsibilities, and this left him extra time for Senate work and for special study. Also, he continued his policy, developed in the Georgia legislature, of working behind the scenes and building up personal relationships between himself and his colleagues. He actually made very few speeches on the Senate floor. He considered that most speeches were mainly for show; he believed in quiet, effective work in committee rooms, over lunch, or in his office. His only public fight on an economic issue was in support of his bill to restrict the imports of jute which, he claimed, competed unfairly with cotton bagging.
Just as Russell was becoming well established in the Senate, he had to make a bid for reelection in 1936. His opponent was Governor Eugene Talmadge, one of Georgia's best-known and most flamboyant politicians and father of our former colleague, Herman Talmadge. Although Talmadge was a highly controversial figure who had even called out troops to enforce some of his decrees, Russell and his friends recognized the governor as a formidable candidate. "Old Gene," with his red suspenders and folksy manner, was reputed to have the special admiration of the state's farmers. By 1934 and 1935, Talmadge had also become one of the New Deal's sharpest critics.
Russell, however, was not daunted or intimidated by such opposition. He vigorously defended the New Deal and his support for it and stressed what he had done in Washington to assist farmers and working people. Russell attacked Talmadge and his record as governor head on. He accused the governor of forsaking the common people and lining up with rich Republicans. It was a rough-and-tumble campaign characterized by large and unruly crowds, fist fights among candidates' supporters, and charges and countercharges. Talmadge finally tried to capitalize on the race issue by accusing Russell of not being strong in support of white supremacy and segregation. Russell denied that he had ever compromised on the principle of white supremacy and called Talmadge's charge "despicable." Russell regretted having to discuss racial matters, but handled the matter skillfully and successfully. Unlike many other southern politicians of that period, Russell opposed bringing the race question into election campaigns.
This was not the kind of campaign that Russell liked, but, when challenged and aroused, he was a master fighter on the campaign trail. When the results were in, Russell had piled up a huge victory of 256,154 votes to 134,659 for Talmadge. Russell's victory in 1936 was so overwhelming and decisive that no other candidate ever again challenged him for his Senate seat. He won five additional elections without opposition. There was no better testimony to his popularity among the people of Georgia.
Former Senator Herman Talmadge, in his recently published memoir, asserted that his father was the state's most popular politician and "in a simple one-on-one contest" could have beaten Russell.
The race was not Talmadge versus Russell so much as Talmadge versus Roosevelt. In Georgia in 1936, it probably would have been easier to run against Jesus Christ than against Franklin D. Roosevelt. The same people who thought that Papa was a pretty good governor didn't want him to go to Washington to vote against the New Deal.
Although by the late 1930's Russell was having some doubts about aspects of Roosevelt's policies and programs, in the area of agriculture and farm policy he was making his mark as an avid New Dealer and true friend of the farmer. Russell was a dedicated and confirmed agrarian. Like Thomas Jefferson, he believed deeply in the political and economic importance of an independent farming class. The family farm was, in his view, one of the nation's most important and stabilizing influences. Thus, Russell was always concerned about the welfare of farmers, and he became a strong advocate of help for the small, family-type farmers. He supported all of the basic agricultural legislation enacted after 1933, including the Agricultural Adjustment Act, farm credit, and soil conservation programs. But these programs did very little, if anything, for the tens of thousands of poor tenants and sharecroppers. What could be done to help the poorest farmers, many of whom were located in the South?
Beginning in 1935, Russell pushed measures that would help poor tenants and sharecroppers to become landowners by lending them money to buy land and equipment. The most important law to help the poorer class of farmers was the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act of 1937, which Russell enthusiastically supported. The problem was to get funds to provide the necessary loans. It was here that he played a major role in his position as chairman of the subcommittee on agricultural appropriations. Not only in the subcommittee but also in conference committee, he often beat back attempts to reduce the meager appropriations for the Farm Security Administration (FSA). It was not a popular program with many senators, and Russell had to use all of his influence to get even modest appropriations. In the spring of 1942, when it appeared that the Congress would drastically cut money for the FSA, President Roosevelt called personally on Russell to save the program. With the cooperation of several influential colleagues, Russell was able to retain most of the funds requested by the president. When the fight was over, Roosevelt wrote to Russell, thanking him for his "legislative leadership." Throughout the late 1930's and early 1940's, farmers owed their direct parity payments, soil conservation payments, and loans from the FSA more to Russell than to any other single leader in Washington.
In the mid-1930's, he began supporting the idea of a federally funded school lunch program to help needy children and to reduce agricultural surpluses. After operating for several years without legislative authority, the program became permanent in 1946, thanks to Russell's determined advocacy. He also backed the food stamp plan, which began on an experimental basis in 1939. He was a compassionate man and believed strongly that government should assist those who were needy and could not help themselves.
While he considered himself among the loyal New Deal Democrats, he was a man of independent thought and judgment. He would not necessarily support an issue just because it enjoyed the support of the president or the Democratic party. By the late 1930's, he frequently found that he had to oppose the president. In 1937, when Roosevelt attempted to restructure the Supreme Court, Russell did not automatically fight the proposal as many of his colleagues did. It was his nature and inclination to seek some kind of compromise between the president, who wanted some basic changes in the court, and those who found any change whatever to be abhorrent. When the president rejected a compromise plan advanced by Russell and a few other senators, the Georgian joined those who defeated the Court packing bill. He also opposed the president's attempt, in the 1938 elections, to purge some senators, one of whom was his Georgia colleague, Walter George.
The emerging issue in the 1930's that caused Russell the gravest concern was embodied in proposed federal legislation to guarantee civil rights for blacks. His views on race had been determined by the culture, traditions, and racial practices with which he had been raised. As a believer in the superiority of Anglo-Saxon culture and institutions, he maintained that blacks were basically inferior to whites. He did not dislike blacks and wished them well so long as their progress occurred within their own racial group. Although, for example, he was a strong supporter of black colleges, he was vehement against what he called "race mixing" and insisted that both whites and blacks would be better off under strictly segregated conditions. He repeatedly argued that race mixing would lead to intermarriage and what he called "mongrelization" of the races. Above all, he believed that Congress had no right to intervene in race relations within a state. That, he argued, would violate states' rights-rights belonging to the states and protected by the Constitution. In other words, while he opposed racial integration, his arguments against civil rights legislation were usually based on constitutional grounds.
The problem, however, was that, throughout much of the country, there was a growing demand for Congress to enact legislation to protect black citizens' rights, which had been denied to them by both legal and extralegal methods. An early civil rights campaign focused on the passage of anti-lynching legislation. When an anti-lynching bill was introduced in 1935, Russell and other southern senators easily defeated the measure with a short filibuster. But, in 1938, another anti-lynching measure came before the Senate. By that time, a group of eighteen to twenty southern senators had organized into what became known as the Southern Bloc for the purpose of defeating anti-lynching and other legislation designed to protect and enhance the rights of blacks. Senator Tom Connally of Texas was the nominal leader of the group, but, by 1940, these senators looked to Senator Russell for genuine leadership. Because of his knowledge of Senate rules, his parliamentary skill, and his organizational ability, Russell emerged as the main spokesman and defender of the South's position on race.
No man in the United States Congress could speak more eloquently about the history, traditions, and virtues of the Old South than Richard Russell. He loved the South, as it had developed over generations, with an almost militant passion. Southern society might not be perfect, he once admitted, but it was nearly so. He believed that racial integration would destroy this ideal condition. He also believed that attacks on racial segregation were directed by what he called "South haters" who really did not know or understand the region or its people.
Russell spoke movingly and passionately against the 1938 anti-lynching bill in the Senate. He was no demagogue or race baiter as were some other southern political leaders. He presented serious arguments against the measure, but they were always based on his fundamental understanding of desirable race relations. He was as strongly against the heinous crime of lynching as was anyone else. What alarmed him in this instance was the belief that passage of an anti-lynching bill would set a pattern for additional federal legislation. Next, he said, there would be federal control of elections in the southern states; then legislation to ban segregation on public transportation and in public places; guarantees of equal employment opportunities; and, finally, laws to require social equality in schools, health facilities, and colleges. Such a legislative agenda, he argued, would violate states' rights and change the nature of his beloved South. Until World War II, Russell and his colleagues were able to turn back civil rights bills, but they were unable to kill the president's Fair Employment Practices Committee (FEPC), which, in 1941, began to protect employment rights of blacks. During World War II and into the postwar years, Russell did everything he could to handicap and reduce the effectiveness of the FEPC, but without much success.
As the war clouds rose in Asia and Europe in the 1930's, Russell, as a member of the Naval Affairs Committee, began devoting increasing attention to national defense and foreign affairs. Like most other Americans in the years after World War I, he held firm isolationist views. Speaking in opposition to joining the World Court in 1935, he warned his colleagues against becoming drawn into European quarrels and conflicts. He believed that George Washington's admonition to be friends with all nations and allies of none was the correct course to follow. Surely, the United States should stay out of European entanglements. "My views are those of a nationalist," he said, and he was "for the United States of America first." While he wanted to avoid using American military power to settle other nations' problems, he was a vigorous advocate of keeping the United States militarily strong. Russell strongly supported the two-ocean navy which his fellow Georgian, Representative Carl Vinson, was pushing. Russell had a special interest in developing aircraft carriers.
Although Russell did not become prominently involved in the debate over the neutrality legislation of the 1930's, after World War II broke out in 1939, he supported the American military build-up and the president's plans to aid Britain. He told a 4-H group in 1940 that "our policy of aiding Great Britain and the democracies is now the first national policy of our government. It is too late now to debate; it is our duty to support the president." Besides supporting aid to Great Britain, this statement reflects Russell's acceptance of presidential leadership in foreign policy matters. He championed the Selective Service Act, but he took the progressive position that no person or corporation should profit unduly from defense or war. Men should not be drafted, he argued, unless industries were also forced to contribute to the war effort as the government needed and directed. He was able to push to enactment some legislation requiring the cooperation of industry in the defense effort, but it was a much weaker law than he had hoped for.
During World War II, Senator Russell headed a committee of five senators who visited the world's far-flung battlefields where American troops were engaged. The purpose of the trip was to help Congress determine if American supplies and equipment were adequate and if they were being used effectively. The group left Washington on July 25, 1943, and did not return until September 28. The senators went first to England, then to North Africa, the Persian Gulf region, India, China, and Australia. Russell was greatly impressed with the quality and performance of American troops, and, for the most part, he approved of the operations that he had an opportunity to observe. He was critical, however, of the way some military supplies were being used by American allies.
Upon returning home, Russell gave a detailed report to the full Senate on the committee's trip. He dealt with several major issues that became highly important in the postwar years. He insisted that the United States should retain some of the bases and land parcels that had been won with the blood of American fighting men. Such bases and facilities, he argued, would be needed to guarantee American security and to preserve the peace. While some commentators accused him of being imperialistic, Russell claimed that such bases would be absolutely necessary for the United States to help maintain world stability after the war. He also warned the United States against disbursing huge amounts of relief and aid to countries around the world following the war. He believed that leaders he had met in his extensive travels had unrealistic expectations of what the United States should or could do.
Toward the close of the war, he was beginning to view our wartime ally, the Soviet Union, as untrustworthy and expansionistic. Part of this view stemmed from an effort by Russell, in the summer of 1945, to visit Russia after he and a Senate committee had investigated conditions in Western Europe. The Russians delayed issuing Russell an entry permit for so long that he became disgusted and returned home from France. He saw the Russians as unnecessarily suspicious and uncooperative. Russell also was frustrated with what he considered the kid-glove treatment given to defeated Japan. Even after the United States had dropped two atomic bombs on Japanese cities, he did not think that the average citizen of Japan realized the extent of that nation's defeat. Russell urged President Truman to oust the emperor and to march a large army down the streets of Tokyo as a means of impressing the Japanese with the American victory. He did not consider this vindictive; it would only be proper punishment for attacking the United States at Pearl Harbor in 1941.
By the end of World War II, Richard Russell had become one of the United States Senate's leading members. Passage of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 left him with especially strong committee assignments. While he lost his chairmanship of the Immigration Committee, which had been absorbed by the Judiciary Committee, he retained his position on the Appropriations Committee and obtained a seat on the newly formed and powerful Armed Services Committee. When the Democrats regained a majority in Congress in 1949, following their defeat in 1946, Russell ranked second and fourth, respectively, on those two most influential panels. In 1951, he became chairman of the Armed Services Committee, a position that he held until 1969, except for the period from 1953 to 1955 when the Republicans were in control. He gave up the chairmanship of the Armed Services Committee in 1969 to become chairman of the Appropriations Committee. He was also appointed to the first Joint Committee on Atomic Energy in 1946. After the Central Intelligence Agency was established in 1947, he became a member of the CIA's congressional oversight committee. Russell also served on the Senate Democratic Policy Committee, which was formed in 1947, and, a decade later, he became a member of the Democratic Steering Committee. He held strategic positions at many points of political and legislative power.
In the post World War II years, Russell spent much of his time trying to help and protect farmers. He was one of the major participants in the Farm Bloc, an informal group of farm-state senators who were committed to obtaining fuller prosperity for farmers. Among the senators with whom he worked closely on agricultural matters was Republican Milton Young of North Dakota. Russell and Young developed a kind of cotton-wheat coalition that fought hard for legislation to guarantee prices of 90 percent of parity for most basic crops. Russell, Young, and their supporters were able to maintain 90-percent parity well into the mid-1950's.
His interest never lagged in supporting federal programs and agencies that assist farmers. The Farm Security Administration had been effectively killed in 1943, but, in 1945, Congress created a new agency, the Farmers Home Administration. The FHA was supposed to make loans to poor farmers to help them buy land and equipment, but Congress failed to appropriate enough funds to assist many of them. Russell fought hard, as chairman of the subcommittee on agricultural appropriations, to increase funding for the agency, but he achieved only limited success. He had better luck in fighting against cuts for soil conservation. As one of the leading conservationists in the country, he resisted efforts by the Republican Eightieth Congress to reduce the amount of money for soil conservation to what he called a "paltry" $150 million. After a hard fight in 1947, he was able to add nearly $100 million to that amount. He was also responsible for increasing the amount spent on the school lunch program in the postwar years, an achievement that gave him great satisfaction. Senator Russell was equally proud of the Research and Marketing Act, which he pushed through the Senate in 1946.
Although Senator Russell supported much of President Truman's domestic program, he parted company with the chief executive over labor legislation. He voted for the Taft-Hartley bill in 1947, and he voted to override the president's veto of that measure, so hateful to organized labor. Russell was not anti-labor or anti-union. Organized labor had supported him enthusiastically in his races for governor and senator. But he had concluded, by the mid-1940's, that some labor leaders were becoming too powerful and were gaining excessive political influence. He viewed some segments of organized labor's leadership as greedy, selfish, and irresponsible. He was especially concerned with the political activities of the Congress of Industrial Organization's political action committee. Special interests of this kind, he believed, were becoming so powerful that they were threatening the democratic process. Pressure groups were "becoming dangerous" to the independent thinking of House members and senators, he said. "We must retain the legislator's independence of thought," he argued. "It is not a good thing when pressure groups elect a man who is forever beholden to them." Russell, however, had concerns that went beyond the question of general pressure groups. He was annoyed by the lobbying being done by some labor unions for civil rights laws.
By the 1940's, Russell foresaw a problem that was to become of national concern a generation later. That was the spending of huge amounts of money by political action groups on the campaigns of candidates who would support their special interests. Not only were the amounts of money corrupting, in his view, but some representatives and senators also came to use campaign money in ways that made it hardly distinguishable from their private funds. Such use of money was abhorrent to Russell, who was a stickler for honesty and old fashioned morality. In his own campaigns, he had returned to contributors all money that was not needed for actual campaign expenses. He once sent a check for a hundred dollars back to a contributor with a note advising his friend that the amount was too generous and that he really did not need the funds. Thus, he saw the growing use of money in political campaigns, raised by whatever pressure groups, as endangering the democratic political process and threatening the nation's welfare. Russell himself, of course, had little need for campaign money after 1936. The costs of his filing fee and a few advertisements every six years represented the limit of his campaign expenses.
Russell also advocated restrictions on immigration. He strongly supported the National Origins Act of 1924, which limited total immigration to about 150,000 a year and favored northern European immigrants through a quota system. He opposed extending quotas to Asian and African countries, because he felt that immigrants from those nations would change the national racial complexion and reduce the Anglo-Saxon influences of which he was so proud. He once boasted that only .7 percent of Georgia's population was foreign born. He was one of the leaders in fighting President Truman's plan in 1946 to admit some 400,000 refugees. Russell believed that the admission of thousands of European refugees would open the floodgates for refugees from all over the world. He wanted to tighten immigration laws, not loosen them. While he fought hard against the Truman policy, he could only delay and modify it.
Although Senator Russell opposed some of Truman's domestic policies, he lent strong support to the president's policies to block Russian aggression. When the president called for economic and military aid for Greece and Turkey in 1947, Russell backed the plan. He also voted for the Marshall Plan, which provided for spending billions over four years to help restore the economies of Western European countries. While initially supporting foreign aid as a means of helping countries regain economic and military strength to resist Communism, he soon became disillusioned with the foreign aid program. He favored humanitarian assistance and programs for self-help, but, by 1952, he had become one of the bitterest opponents of the unending flow of American funds to countries all around the world. He had several objections to the foreign aid program: its failure to win friends for the United States; waste; burdens to American taxpayers; and its open-endedness. To his thinking, foreign aid became a bottomless pit into which hard-earned American taxpayer dollars were thrown year after year with little or no benefit to the United States. Consequently, he worked hard to defeat foreign aid bills in the 1950's and 1960's, but was only able to reduce the amounts appropriated. Even that limited achievement, he believed, was worthy of his efforts.
There was no more ardent cold warrior in Congress than Richard B. Russell. He considered the Soviet Union to be imperialistic and the source of most postwar problems throughout the world. He used his influence on the Armed Services Committee and the Appropriations Committee to strengthen conventional military forces and to develop new weapons. He bitterly opposed sharing any atomic secrets with the Russians. He viewed the conflict between that nation and the United States as a worldwide battle between good and evil. When the North Koreans invaded South Korea in 1950, he saw that action as an extension of Soviet power through one of its satellites, an action that must be resisted.
Although Russell was reasonably well satisfied with the early Truman presidency, the civil rights issue drew him into opposition to his old Senate colleague. Truman's legislative program included the establishment of a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission, abolition of segregation in the armed forces, passage of anti-poll-tax legislation, and other measures to guarantee rights and opportunities for blacks. Following the president's special message on civil rights in February 1948, Russell wrote a constituent that the president's proposals were the "most outrageous affront to the people of our section that we have had to face since Reconstruction days." Not only did Russell oppose actions that might break down segregation and destroy white supremacy, but he also believed that Truman's constant pressing for civil rights would split the Democratic party and lead to Republican victory in 1948. The Republicans had already won control of Congress as a result of the mid-term elections of 1946, and Russell and other prominent Democrats had lost their committee chairmanships.
Regardless of adverse consequences to the Democratic party, Senator Russell believed that he must fight the Truman civil rights program with all his power. On March 6, 1948, twenty-one southern senators met in Virginia Senator Harry Byrd's office to plan their strategy to resist and defeat the president's program. These senators named Russell as their leader, a position he had held informally for several years. Together, they worked out plans to keep close watch in the Senate to make sure that no civil rights bills were enacted through some unexpected parliamentary maneuvering. This Southern Bloc saw Truman's effort to eliminate Jim Crow practices as the "opening wedge in the fight to stop all segregation," which, in practice, meant that blacks and whites would "attend the same schools, swim in the same pools, eat together, and eventually, inter-marry."
So strong was the opposition to Truman's stand on civil rights that many southerners opposed the president's renomination in 1948. But who could the anti-Truman Democrats put in the race for the nomination? Finally, the anti-civil rights southerners prevailed on Richard Russell to let his name be placed before the convention delegates. Russell knew that he had no chance for the nomination, and he wrote, "I was very reluctant to permit the use of my name, but decided that those who were opposed to Mr. Truman were entitled to have someone for whom they could vote." Russell received 263 delegate votes, but Truman won easily. Loyal Democrat that he was, Russell refused to join the Dixiecrats. He quietly voted for Truman, but did nothing to help in the Democratic campaign.
It was not long before Russell had an opportunity to help the increasingly beleaguered president. Because of differences between General Douglas MacArthur and the president over basic policy and strategy in the Korean War, Truman removed MacArthur from command in the spring of 1951. The dismissal of a highly popular general by an unpopular president raised a storm of protest against Truman, whose administration was already under attack as being soft on communism and filled with corruption.
Senator Russell entered this supercharged atmosphere and calmed the political storm swirling around the president. Russell chaired a joint committee of inquiry that looked into both the removal of MacArthur and the foreign policies of the United States in the Far East. The hearings lasted from early May until late June, as the committee heard MacArthur and scores of other witnesses. Russell skillfully guided the hearings in a fair, calm, and rational way, and, by summer's end, the issue had largely faded from public consciousness. Truman was deeply grateful to him for the manner in which he had handled the entire matter and had quieted the controversy.
During the hearings, Russell had made one thing abundantly clear; he believed that some senators were too loose-lipped, and were more interested in making points with the press through leaks than in protecting the nation's security. As witnesses talked about military tactics and strategy in the executive sessions, he emphasized that such information must be kept absolutely confidential. He warned his colleagues about "a careless word, a slip of the tongue" that might help America's enemies. When some of General George C. Marshall's testimony was leaked to the press, Russell was furious and lectured his fellow senators on the importance of guarding against indiscreet statements. He added that, if such leaks endangered the lives of American soldiers in Korea, neither "our God nor our fellow citizens will ever forgive us, nor would we deserve forgiveness." He believed that there was a common sense balance between providing the people with enough information on which to make proper policy decisions, and, at the same time, maintaining sufficient secrecy to protect the country's security.
Another crucial issue that came up in the MacArthur hearings was that of "executive privilege." When Republican Senator Alexander Wiley attempted to make General Omar Bradley reveal his personal conversations with the president on April 6, 1950, Bradley refused to tell the committee what Truman had said. When Wiley persisted, Russell ruled that a "private conversation between the president and the Chief of Staff as to detail can be protected by the witness if he so desires." This was a strong statement upholding executive privilege, and, moreover, reflected his deep respect for the office of the presidency. He also had a strong commitment to the principle of separation of powers.
The MacArthur hearings gave Senator Russell a great deal of national exposure. He did not normally seek publicity. Indeed, he did not have a press secretary in his office until 1959. But, whether or not he wanted publicity, he now was the subject of scores of articles in newspapers and magazines. These accounts reviewed his career and activities in a depth not previously known. Richard Strout wrote in the Christian Science Monitor that Russell was the "most powerful man in the Senate" and that body's de facto leader.
In late 1950 and early 1951, many of Russell's colleagues urged him to accept the position of Senate majority leader, but he refused to seek or accept the formal leadership post. Explaining that he disagreed with too much of the administration's legislative agenda, especially that dealing with civil rights, Russell stated that he wanted to maintain "absolute independence of thought and action." While he did not want to be majority leader himself, no Democrat could gain the position without his support. In 1951, he endorsed Ernest McFarland of Arizona, who was elected. At the same time, he threw his support for majority whip to his young Texas friend, Lyndon B. Johnson. Johnson had no claim to the position, except that he had the backing of Richard Russell, which was what counted. This was the beginning of the rapid rise of Lyndon Johnson in the Senate's Democratic hierarchy. It was based on his close personal and political friendship with the Senate southern kingpin, Senator Russell. It was Russell, more than anyone else, who was responsible for making Lyndon Johnson majority leader in 1955.
The growing influence of northern liberals in the Democratic party during the Truman years caused Russell grave concern. From his perspective, the most troublesome issue was the continued demand for civil rights legislation. It was clear that the South's influence in national party affairs was declining. The uppermost question in his mind was how to restore and increase the southern role in party councils. One possible avenue was to support a strong southern candidate for the presidential nomination in 1952. While a southerner probably would not be able to win the Democratic nomination, the strength flowing to a candidate from the South might influence the platform and the party's general philosophical direction. At least this was the hope of many southerners.
The most logical man in the South to make such a race was Richard Russell. As the 1952 nominating campaigns approached, many southerners urged him to actively seek the nomination, but he was reluctant. Always the realist, he told supporters that no southerner who opposed civil rights laws had any chance to win the Democratic nomination for president. Despite numerous denials that he would seek the nomination, he came under increasing pressure to enter the race. Governors James Byrnes of South Carolina and Herman Talmadge of Georgia, and Senators Burnet Maybank of South Carolina and Harry F. Byrd were the leading advocates of a Russell candidacy. Finally, he gave in to the desires of his friends and announced, on February 28, 1952, that he would be a candidate for president and would campaign for the nomination. Surrounded by Senators Russell Long of Louisiana, Burnet Maybank, and John Stennis of Mississippi, Senator Russell told reporters that he would seek the position on a platform favoring states' rights, a strong defense, and economical and honest government. Most observers from all sections of the country admitted that Russell was well qualified for the presidency, but most writers discounted his chances because, as columnist Doris Fleeson declared, he was "saddled with the traditional southern attitude on civil rights."
Despite this obvious handicap, Russell made a strong bid for the nomination, defeated Estes Kefauver in the Florida primary, and then went on a nationwide tour in search of delegates. Yet, no matter how hard he tried to present himself as a moderate Democrat who had supported most of the New Deal and much of the Fair Deal, he could not remove the image that he was only a regional candidate. When the Democrats met, he could only attract 268 delegate votes, mostly from the South, and the convention went on to nominate Adlai Stevenson. Russell had been right about his own chances. As Harry Truman said, Russell might have been elected president if he had lived in Indiana, Missouri, or Kentucky, but the country was not ready to nominate a Georgian. Calvin W. Rawlings, Democratic national committeeman from Utah, wrote of Russell that "if it were not for geography and by the grace of God," he could have been nominated instead of Stevenson. Russell was offered the vice presidency, but that was an office in which he had no interest whatever.
Russell voted for Stevenson, but he refused to assist in the campaign. The Democratic platform, which had a pro-civil rights plank, was too distasteful to Russell. Despite his disagreement with the so-called liberal Democrats, he took no pleasure in Dwight D. Eisenhower's victory and the resulting control of both houses of Congress by the Republicans. Russell made it clear that he would fight to retain the New Deal and Fair Deal gains against any Republican onslaught.
During the Eisenhower presidency, Russell devoted most of his energies to three major issues-agriculture, defense, and civil rights. The farm problem was never very far from his mind. After 1953, large surpluses built up, prices declined, and operating expenses rose, placing farmers in a tough cost-price squeeze. As a result of hard times on the farm, tens of thousands of farmers went out of business each year. To Russell, this was a national tragedy and dangerous to American strength and stability.
Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson, with President Eisenhower's blessing, set out to reduce the level of federal price supports on major farm commodities. Russell believed that this was a serious mistake, and he fought to preserve and extend price supports at 90 percent of parity. Some bitter battles ensued before he and his farm-state supporters lost the fight in a Congress that was becoming more and more consumer oriented. Beginning in 1955, flexible price supports were inaugurated that led to lower support prices for most major agricultural commodities. Russell protested that Congress did not treat farmers fairly and wrote to one constituent that he could not understand the "policies of this [Eisenhower] administration which are threatening to destroy rural America." He was more successful in getting funds for conservation, agricultural research, school lunches, and other purposes.
In all of the controversies over farm policy in which Russell engaged, one fact emerged that greatly disturbed him. That was the declining political power of agriculture. His correspondence in the 1950's is filled with references to this trend. One reason rural America was losing its political clout, he believed, was the division among farm spokesmen themselves. He thought, however, that a much more important reason was the fact that farmers were being sacrificed on the altar of a cheap food policy that catered to consumers in the growing urban centers. But, however hard he tried, he could not change policies that resulted from basic demographic shifts. Despite his criticism of the Eisenhower administration, federal expenditures on agricultural programs rose sharply after 1953. Although it could hardly be said that the federal government was neglecting farmers, Russell believed that he could have developed better farm programs.
Other than national defense, the issue of greatest concern to Senator Russell in the fifteen years after 1948 was civil rights. The increasing demands for legislation that would end legal segregation required his constant attention. As leader of the Southern Bloc, he spent untold hours developing strategy and organizing the eighteen southern senators who made up the core of resistance to civil rights bills.
Until 1953, he and his supporters had effectively used the filibuster to block civil rights legislation. Attempts of civil rights proponents to change Senate Rule XXII, so that a majority instead of two-thirds of the senators could shut off debate, had been defeated by southerners with some conservative Republican help. Russell, however, not only opposed restrictions on lengthy debate designed to keep civil rights bills from coming to a vote; he also sincerely believed in the principle of full and free discussion on every issue. To him, unlimited debate was one of the Senate's most cherished and sacred practices and traditions.
He was especially concerned about the breakdown of segregation in federal agencies, including government departments, hospitals, and military posts, because the change had been accomplished by administrative action, and there was nothing that segregationists in Congress could do to stop the trend. He had even gone so far in 1948 as to introduce legislation that would give men entering the military services the right to choose a segregated or integrated unit. The next year, he introduced a bill that would have encouraged blacks in the South to relocate to other parts of the country through a subsidy to black families. He believed that civil rights advocates did not know the true problems of having large numbers of blacks living under integrated conditions. His bill, he said, would expose the hypocrisy of northern integrationists. According to Russell, these so-called liberals were more interested in courting the black vote than in supporting any principle of human rights. In any event, neither of these bills gained any significant support in Congress, but they did express the depth of his feeling on the race issue.
He also had a growing fear that segregation would be destroyed by the federal courts, thereby bypassing Congress. Nevertheless, he was hardly prepared for the Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Topeka Board of Education, handed down in May 1954, which held that segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. He called the decision a "flagrant abuse of the judicial power," which "strikes down the right of the states…to direct their most vital local affairs."
As a result of the Brown case and other civil rights developments, Russell and a number of other southern senators drew up the Declaration of Constitutional Principles, better known as the "Southern Manifesto." Russell prepared the final draft, which criticized the Supreme Court and promised that southerners would use all lawful means to reverse the Brown decision.
Meanwhile, civil rights bills were being considered in Congress. By 1957, it was clear even to Russell that some kind of civil rights legislation would be enacted regardless of southern opposition. Thus, he turned his energies and influence to weakening a bill that had already passed the House in June 1957, hoping to make the measure as ineffective as possible in-as he viewed it-disturbing race relations in the South. While one of the bill's main features was to guarantee blacks the right to vote, he believed that it gave the attorney general far too much power to "force intermingling of the races in the public schools and in all places of public entertainment." He was especially upset over the denial of a jury trial for any violators of civil rights legislation.
Although some southern senators wanted to stage another filibuster, Russell, as leader of the Southern Bloc, advised otherwise. Working with his friend, Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson, he skillfully removed the most distasteful features of the bill. From the southern viewpoint, the worst provisions had been eliminated by the time the law passed. Critic Thomas L. Stokes wrote that the bill had been watered down by Johnson, "the errand boy for Senator Richard B. Russell, who put Lyndon Johnson in the post of leadership." Time magazine carried Russell's picture on its cover on August 12, 1957, and, in an accompanying article, called his resistance to civil rights legislation "one of the notable performances of Senate history."
Russell, himself, was proud of his efforts. He considered keeping the federal government "out of our schools and social order" the "sweetest victory of my twenty-five years as a senator." He was equally successful in defeating the tougher provisions of the 1960 Civil Rights Act. In that case, he organized his eighteen-member Southern Bloc into teams of three and so wore down the Senate that only minor gains were included in the bill, and then only with his permission. After that fight, Senator Harry F. Byrd of Virginia declared that, under the superb leadership of Senator Russell, southerners had "demonstrated the effectiveness of courageous massive resistance."
By the early 1960's, however, Russell recognized that effective and meaningful civil rights legislation would be passed. The national mood had changed, southern resistance had weakened, and an effective political leader, Lyndon Johnson, had become president. After Johnson moved into the White House, Russell frankly admitted that nothing he and other anti-civil rights forces could do would be sufficient to stop civil rights legislation. After all, Russell was a political realist. As the 1964 Civil Rights Act was about to be passed, he spoke movingly, and at length, against it. His purpose, however, was to make a statement of principle, with no thought of defeating the measure. He knew that the outcome had already been determined. After passage of the law, he urged all people to "comply with the law of the land," a statement that brought praise from President Johnson. When Congress passed further civil rights legislation in 1965, Russell was too ill to resist it actively.
Richard B. Russell never changed his mind on the issue of racial integration. He viewed civil rights laws as 'force bills" designed to change race relations in the South. He believed, too, that much of the support for civil rights legislation came from what he called "South haters." On most issues, he was flexible and able to compromise, but, on the question of racial integration and white supremacy, he died holding the same views as those held by his southern ancestors. History, tradition, and social relations, as they had developed in the South after slavery, possessed an unbreakable hold on him. Indeed, he viewed federal legislation to guarantee equal rights for blacks as a repetition of the intervention by national authorities in the South during the era of Reconstruction.
Senator Russell may never have adjusted to some of the country's social changes, but he was one of the strongest advocates of a powerful national defense in the post World War II years. As chairman of the Armed Services Committee and a member of the Appropriations Committee, he was in a position to exert great influence on strengthening American military forces. He had little faith in the United Nations as a peacekeeping agency, and believed that the United States could not rely on the NATO countries to preserve peace and stability. He once said that, if Russia should attack Italy, all of the American arms provided to that NATO ally would soon be in Russian hands.
Even after the death of Joseph Stalin in 1953, and what appeared to be less aggressive attitudes by the Soviet Union, Russell's views toward Russia remained the same. He did not trust the Russians and declared that the only hope for peace in the world was for the United States to strengthen its military forces. He believed that any negotiations with the Soviet Union must be conducted "from strength rather than from weakness." Surely, his highest national priority was to build and maintain a degree of military power that could not be successfully challenged by any nation in the world. Consequently, he favored universal military training; strengthening the conventional armed forces; maintaining a supply of nuclear weapons, with the planes and missiles to deliver them; and adequate appropriations for the development of ever more highly sophisticated and technical weapons.
He had little faith in the massive retaliation theories of John Foster Dulles, President Eisenhower's secretary of state. To Russell, such a policy relied too heavily on nuclear retaliation, which could lead to the destruction of both Russia and the United States. Under the Dulles policy, there would be greater reliance on nuclear power so that cuts could be made in conventional forces and money saved. Russell objected strenuously to President Eisenhower's recommendation to reduce appropriations for some of the regular military services, especially the air force. He believed that the Strategic Air Command had been the major deterrent to greater Soviet expansion. Russell wanted more bombers, fighter planes, and support services for the air force, and when his critics talked about the need to cut defense costs, he replied that economy was important, but only after American defenses had been built up. "I want to see planes first and then consider the cost in dollars," he said. He recommended spending more on national defense, even if other government programs, such as foreign aid, had to be reduced. He declared that "the policy of increasing the appropriations for foreign aid and for many domestic activities while reducing our armed strength is completely incomprehensible to me."
Russell became so unhappy over military cuts and large foreign aid expenditures in the 1950's that he once suggested, not entirely with tongue in cheek, that the entire foreign aid appropriation be transferred to the air force. He told Senator Kenneth McKellar of Tennessee that the State Department had no answer to a foreign problem except "to pump in a few more millions from the pockets of our taxpayers into the troubled area." Russell and his backers were able to reduce foreign aid outlays somewhat during the 1950's, but he was unable to get as much money for additional military equipment as he wished. He was distressed that more funds could not be appropriated for the most sophisticated weapons. By 1959, he believed that a serious missile gap existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. Criticizing the Eisenhower military budget for fiscal 1961, Russell declared that it was no time to "quibble over a couple of billion dollars." '
Russell found in President John F. Kennedy an ally for greater military spending. When Kennedy asked for an increase of two billion dollars, mostly for bombers and missiles, early in 1961, Russell gave the request his strongest support. He was able to obtain even more funds for the military budget than the president had requested.
One of Russell's reasons for wanting overwhelming military strength was to deal with problems such as the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. When Kennedy called Senate and House leaders to a conference on that crisis, Russell strongly urged that air power be used to wipe out the Soviet missiles in Cuba. But when Kennedy decided on a quarantine of Cuba instead, Russell announced that he would fully back the president. In such a situation, he said, "the only voice that can speak for the United States was the president." Russell always regretted, however, that military action was not taken against Castro when a good excuse presented itself, as he believed had been the case in 1962. To have solved that problem with forceful action, he argued, would have had "a salutary effect all over the entire world" by discouraging other brush-fire revolutions and wars encouraged by the Soviet Union.
His continued distrust of the Soviets was reflected in his vote against the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in September 1963. This was an agonizing decision for him, but he told his colleagues that the treaty was flawed because it did not contain proper or verifiable inspection clauses to guarantee Russian compliance. He pointed to the numerous treaties that the Russians had violated.
From the beginning, Richard Russell was an outspoken opponent of American military involvement in Vietnam. He had supported the Korean War because it was a response to direct invasion by the North Koreans, but he believed the situation was different in Vietnam. He almost had a phobia against involving American forces in a land campaign on the continent of Asia. Consequently, when President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles asked congressional leaders about supplying American air power to help the collapsing French forces in Vietnam in April 1954, Russell spoke vigorously against such a move. He argued that sending air support to the French would be the first step toward greater involvement and the possible use of ground troops. "Once you've committed the flag," he declared, "you've committed the country. There's no turning back; if you involve the American Air Force, why, you've involved the nation." That, he said, would be a fatal mistake.
As Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson gradually extended American military power into Vietnam, Russell grew increasingly uneasy. It was bad policy, he believed, because the Vietnamese were not doing much to help themselves, and American allies refused to provide any meaningful help. It was wrong to try to go it alone, he said. But, believing deeply that only the president could be the spokesman for America's foreign policy, he supported the American objectives in Vietnam, if not the means to achieve them. Russell insisted that, once the United States was in Vietnam, much more military power should be brought to bear on the North Vietnamese. By 1966, he was advocating the use of a battleship to bombard the coast of Vietnam, the bombing of military and industrial targets around Hanoi, blockading the port of Haiphong, and other measures that would either defeat the North Vietnamese or force the Communists into meaningful negotiations. But President Johnson ignored his old mentor's advice. Russell went to his grave still frustrated and critical of what he considered America's halfway military measures in Vietnam.
Senator Russell disagreed with most of America's major foreign policies after World War II. He placed his greatest confidence in a strong national defense, both nuclear and non-nuclear. He believed in using military force only when American national interests were directly at stake. In the case of Cuba, he would have used force because he believed that Soviet intrusion ninety miles from the Florida coast was a direct threat to the nation's vital interest. On the other hand, there was no overriding reason, in his view, to intervene in Vietnam. He raised the key question of why Communism in faraway Vietnam was worthy of American military resistance when the United States refused to dislodge a Communist state close to home. To him, this was not only mistaken policy; it cast aside common sense as well. Yet, despite his disagreement with much of American foreign policy after 1945, he was a loyal, patriotic leader who fought hard for what he believed was in the country's best interest. He was a strong nationalist in every sense of that term.
By early 1971, at the end of thirty-eight years in the United States Senate, Senator Russell had left his indelible mark on national affairs. No major legislation bore his name, mainly because he had worked quietly behind the scenes and had not sought credit or courted publicity. But he had made numerous permanent contributions. These included agricultural legislation, the food stamp and school lunch programs, the conservation of natural resources, a strong national defense, research and scientific achievement, and many more.
Senator Russell's Senate colleagues were among his most ardent admirers. They respected him for his intellect, his integrity, his fairness, his courage, and his ability to cut to the heart of any problem. Special accolades from fellow senators were common, but they were almost embarrassing to him at the time of his thirtieth anniversary in the Senate in January 1963. Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana referred to his "calmness and kindness," his "reason and deliberation," and his "scrupulous fairness." Everett Dirksen of Illinois emphasized Russell's "rare fidelity to the traditions and the institutions of this country," while Frank Carlson of Kansas believed that Russell was "the most influential and substantial leader in the U. S. Senate."
Writer William S. White was one of the many observers outside the Senate who were impressed with Russell's character and ability. White called him one of the "greatest senators of his era." While Russell suffered from being a southerner, White explained, "no politician in his time has more clearly and more repeatedly earned consideration for the highest office of them all." North Carolina Senator Sam Ervin agreed that, after viewing all national leaders, Russell was the best qualified man to be president of the United States. When the publication Pageant asked senators to rank the five top members of that body in 1964, those of us who were Russell's colleagues at that time listed him as number one.
One trait or habit that Russell possessed, and which his colleagues greatly admired, was the consideration which he extended to new senators. Freshmen senators often achieved more than they expected because of his help. On September 14, 1959, Senator Howard A. Cannon of Nevada wrote to Russell expressing his appreciation "for your outstanding leadership…and for the help and consideration you have given to me as a junior senator." I wrote to Senator Russell at about the same time saying that it had been a "glorious experience" to have served with him during my first year in the Senate. A few months later, I wrote again that Russell typified "the character, the poise, the brilliance that are associated with true greatness." I continued, "You shall never know the profundity of the impression you have made upon me as a new senator." I concluded that it was my greatest hope to "become a senator with the stature of Richard B. Russell."
Senator Russell was a southern patrician of the old school. He was not garrulous, never a gasconader, but always courtly, courteous, charming, polite, and considerate. He was generally tolerant and understanding, but he could be devastating in debate and comment, as many discovered who were the targets of his sharp tongue and quick wit. He once called Drew Pearson a skunk, and referred to Joseph Alsop's column as "all-slop."
As Russell never married, he lived in Washington hotels from 1933 until 1962, when he purchased an apartment at the Potomac Plaza. During his early years in Washington, he enjoyed an active social life, attending movies and sporting events, meeting friends in the late afternoon, or taking a lady friend to dinner. He disliked cocktail parties and receptions, so popular in Washington, and, after a few years, he turned down most of the many invitations he received. He never sought the limelight and preferred to spend the evenings in his room working on Senate business or reading history. He did enjoy quietly socializing with fellow senators. He frequently had dinner with Lyndon and Lady Bird Johnson, and Senator Harry Byrd's Apple Blossom Festival was one of Russell's annual highlights. He sometimes went fishing with Senator Willis Robertson of Virginia. His strong interest in sports never diminished, and he attended baseball and football games as long as his health permitted. Football Coach Vince Dooley, at the University of Georgia, said that he had never known anyone outside the coaching staff who knew so much about Georgia football players, their talents, and their strengths as Russell did.
Russell started to have health problems in the mid-1950's. As a teenager, he had begun to smoke heavily and, by the 1950's, he suffered from the early stages of emphysema. He finally stopped smoking, but his respiratory problems continued to get worse in the 1960's, and in early 1965 he was so ill that he had to be absent from the Senate for several months. He also had lung cancer, which was treated successfully but damaged his lungs so severely that he could never recover. Returning to Walter Reed Army Medical Center in January 1971, he struggled with his respiratory difficulties until his death on the afternoon of January 21. He was buried in the family cemetery behind the Russell home at the edge of Winder, Georgia.
Richard B. Russell, Jr., served his state and nation for fifty years and spent more than half of his life in the United States Senate. At the time of his death, he held two positions of great prestige in this body-president pro tempore and chairman of the Appropriations Committee. He left a mark that will always be prominent in the history of this body and in the memories of those, like myself, who served with him for so long in the Senate of the United States.
While attending the 1988 Democratic National Convention in Atlanta, Georgia, I paid a visit to the Richard B. Russell Memorial Library at the University of Georgia in Athens, Georgia, as well as to his old home place at Winder, and to the impressive cemetery where Senator Russell was laid to rest from life's labors. As I stood by his graveside there beneath a soft southern sky, my thoughts ran backward across the years we had served together and to the many times when I had sought his sage counsel and advice. I thought of the example that he had set, as a senator who had truly revered the Senate, and of the impact of his life upon my own. Here, I thought, was a senator who would have graced the Senate well in any era, at any period, in the broad sweep of its two hundred-year history. Richard Russell was someone who, more than anyone else I have ever met, should have been president of the United States.
His life was gentle, and the elements
So mix'd in him that Nature might stand up
And say to all the world `This was a man!
CHRONOLOGY
1897 - Richard Brevard Russell born on November 2 in Winder (Barrow County), Georgia, the fourth child and first son of Richard B. Russell, Sr. and Ina Dillard Russell.
1911 - Attended Gordon Institute at Barnesville, Georgia, until 1913.
1913 - Attended the Seventh District Agricultural and Mechanical School at Powder Springs, Georgia (graduated in 1914).
1915 - Entered the University of Georgia. Member: Gordon Club, Jeffersonian Law Society, Gridiron Club, Sigma Alpha Epsilon Social Fraternity, and Phi Kappa Literary Society as well as Senior Representative on the Pan-Hellenic Council. Graduated in 1918 with a Bachelor of Laws degree.
1918 - Enlisted in the United States Naval Reserves with active duty status. Remained on inactive duty from 1919 to 1923.
1919 - Returned to Winder, Georgia, and began law practice.
1920 - Elected to the Georgia House of Representatives from Barrow County. Re-elected in 1922, 1924, 1926, and 1928.
1921 - Took oath of office as a member of the Georgia House of Representatives. Appointed to the Amendments to the Constitution and Rules Committees.
1923 - Elected Speaker pro tempore by the House. Re-elected in 1925. Appointed to the Amendments to the Constitution, Agriculture, Judiciary, Labor and Labor Statistics, Public Highways, Public Property, Rules, and University of Georgia and its Branches Committees.
1927 - Elected Speaker of the House. Re-elected in 1929. As Speaker served as ex officio chairman of the Rules Committee.
1930 - Elected youngest governor of Georgia at age 33. Sworn in by his father, Chief Justice Richard B. Russell, Sr. on 27 June 1931. Served until 1933.
- As governor, implemented a reorganization of the state government, increased support of highway construction, and established the University System of Georgia.
1932 - Appointed John S. Cohen, publisher of the Atlanta Journal as interim senator following the death of Senator William J. Harris on April 18.
- Elected United States senator from Georgia in a September 14 special election to fill the unexpired term of Senator Harris. Re-elected in 1936, 1942, 1948, 1954, 1960, and 1966.
1933 - Took oath of office as senator and served until 21 January 1971. At 35 years of age, the youngest senator in the 72nd Congress.
- Appointed to the Appropriations, Immigration, Manufactures, and Naval Affairs Committees.
- Also appointed chairman of the Appropriations Committee and Senate floor manager for the Rural Electrification Act.
- Introduced an amendment to the Agricultural Adjustment Act granting the Secretary of Agriculture the authority to raise tariff on jute and its products.
- Strong supporter of President Franklin D. Roosevelt and New Deal legislation until the late 1930s.
1934 - Secured a $45 million-dollar appropriation to continue seed loans to farmers through 1934.
1935 - Authored an amendment to the Works Progress Administration bill giving the president discretionary authorization over wage scales for work relief projects.
- Introduced an amendment to the Emergency Relief Appropriations Act that would provide funds for loans to the small farmer. Eventually incorporated into the Resettlement Administration, the agency focused more on resettlement than loans and provided little assistance to farmers.
- Supported the use of farm surpluses to upgrade school lunches. This measure effectively raised the nutritional level of poverty struck children and decreased farm surpluses thus raising farm prices.
1936 - Defeated Eugene Talmadge for the Senate seat. Ran unopposed in five straight elections (1942, 1948, 1954, 1960, and 1966).
1937 - Worked with Tom Connally (D-TX) to organize the southern senators into a group known as the "Southern Bloc" to oppose an antilynching bill proposed by Robert Wagner (D-NY) and Frederick Van Nuys (D-IN). Russell argued that the bill was an unconstitutional infringement upon states' rights and would lead to further federal intervention into southern race relations.
1938 - Proposed an amendment to the Work Relief Appropriations bill providing parity payments to farmers which was adopted in the bill's final version. Again in 1939 and 1940, secured appropriations for parity payments, and after 1940, parity payments became part of the yearly Agricultural Appropriations bill.
- Voted (with seventy other senators) to recommit a bill (effectively killing the measure) advocating a re-organization of the Supreme Court that would allow President Roosevelt to appoint additional members to the Court. Opposed President Roosevelt's efforts to purge Senator Walter George from the U.S. Senate due to George's outspoken criticism of Roosevelt's re-organization of the Supreme Court. These two activities of Roosevelt eventually led to a break between Russell and the president's New Deal policies.
- Death of Russell's father Richard B. Russell, Sr. on December 3 in Winder, Georgia.
1940 - Supported the Selective Services Act.
1941 - Appointed to the Agriculture and Forestry Committee and served until 1947.
- Appointed chairman of the Immigration Committee and served until 1947.
- Voted for Lend-Lease.
1942 - Campaigned against the passage of a bill to abolish the poll tax.
1943 - Made a global tour of the war front as chairman of the Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program (Truman Committee). As a result of the tour, advocated that the United States retain bases in strategic countries after the war.
1945 - Appointed to the Special Senate Committee on Atomic Energy (later the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy) and served until 1971.
- Toured United States military installations and facilities as head of a committee to investigate conditions in the European and Mediterranean theaters in order to determine post-war activities and responsibilities.
1946 - Authored and secured passage of the Federal School Lunch Program (the Russell-Ellender school lunch bill) which defined the responsibilities of the federal government, the states, and the local school districts. While Congress had appropriated funds (or agricultural surpluses) for school lunches from 1934 onward, this measure provided permanent funding and administration of the program.
- Introduced an amendment to a minimum wage bill that would require the cost of agricultural labor to be included in calculating parity prices. Although the amendment was defeated, by 1949 Congress included farm labor cost in parity prices.
- Fought for and guided through the Senate the Research and Marketing Act of 1946, which allotted funds for agricultural research and improvement in marketing of farm products.
1947 - Appointed to the Senate Democratic Policy Committee and served until 1971.
- Appointed to the Armed Services Committee which replaced the Naval Affairs Committee and the Military Affairs Committee.
- Toured United States facilities in Western Europe as part of a congressional delegation to assess the process of reconstruction and the use of relief funds.
- Voted for the Taft-Hartley bill.
1948 - Led the battle against President Truman's civil rights proposal and the integration of the armed forces.
- Introduced an amendment to the Selective Services Act that permitted an inductee into the armed forces to choose a segregated or integrated unit.
- Received 263 votes at the Democratic National Convention although not a candidate and not in attendance at the convention.
1949 - Introduced a bill to set-up a relocation commission to provide funds for African Americans to migrate from the South to other parts of the United States.
- Introduced an amendment to cut foreign aid from $1.3 billion dollars to $400 million dollars to decrease deficit spending. Amendment narrowly defeated.
- Fought against changes in the cloture rule that would prevent the use of the filibuster (unchecked speech-making) to halt civil rights legislation. Won the fight, thus allowing southern senators to continue filibustering tactics to control civil rights legislation.
1950 - Urged to accept the open position of Senate Majority Leader (due to the defeat of Scott Lucas from Illinois), but declined due to his disagreements with the Truman administration's policies (particularly civil rights).
1951 - Appointed chairman of the Armed Services Committee and served until 1953.
- Chaired the Joint Senate Committee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations that investigated the dismissal of General Douglas MacArthur (known as Committee to Investigate the Military Situation in the Far East).
- Authored, with Tom Connally (D-TX), the Connally-Russell resolution that approved Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander of NATO forces in Europe and the allotment of four divisions of United States troops to Europe.
- Introduced the Universal Military Training bill sponsored by nine members of the Armed Services Committee. The bill required four months of compulsory military training for all men 18 years of age. Although signed into law, Congress could not agree how to implement the plan and thus not enforced.
- Appointed to the congressional delegation responsible for final discussions of the Japanese Peace and Security Treaties.
1952 - Announced candidacy for president of the United States on February 28.
- Won the Florida primary over Senator Estes Kefauver (D-TN) in May.
- Lost the Democratic Party nomination for president to Adlai Stevenson (D-IL) with the third ballot on July 24. Declined the nomination for vice-president.
1953 - Fought (through 1956) against legislation that would decrease cotton acreage, appropriations for agriculture, and parity price supports advocated by the Eisenhower administration.
- Lost chair of Armed Services Committee due to a Republican majority in the Senate.
- Death of Russell's mother, Ina Dillard Russell, on August 30 in Winder, Georgia.
1954 - Spoke vigorously at a State Department meeting on April 3 against supplying United States air power to help the French forces in Indo China (Vietnam). He argued this would be the first step toward greater involvement and the possible use of ground troops, which would be a fatal mistake.
1955 - Regained chair of the Armed Services Committee and served until 1969 when forced to give up position due to his appointment as chairman of the Appropriations Committee.
- Resisted efforts to close Moody Air Force Base, Fort Gordon, and Hunter Field in Georgia.
- Toured United States military installations in Western Europe and visited the Soviet Union.
- Death of Russell's brother Robert Lee Russell in Winder, Georgia.
1956 - With Senators John Stennis (D-MS) and Sam Ervin (D-NC), composed a document representing southern views regarding integration and recent Supreme Court decisions (particularly the Brown decision). On March 12, the Declaration of Constitutional Principles (commonly known as the Southern Manifesto) signed by nineteen senators and seventy-seven representatives was released to the press.
- Endorsed Lyndon B. Johnson (D-TX) as the Democratic candidate for president.
1957 - Appointed to the Democratic Steering Committee and served until 1971.
- Led the fight against the civil rights bill in the Senate. Russell's remarks regarding the bill's extension of federal powers caused public opinion to turn against the measure and considerably weakened enforcement abilities of the Civil Rights Act of 1957.
- Protested Eisenhower's decision to send federal troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, to enforce the 1954 Supreme Court decision integrating public schools.
- Made the August 12 cover of Time magazine for his resistance to civil rights legislation.
1958 - Assisted in guiding the Defense Reorganization Act through the Senate.
1959 - Appointed to the Aeronautical and Space Sciences Committee and served until 1971.
1960 - Organized a filibuster to check the civil rights bill. The maneuver succeeded by weakening the final version which contained no measures for enforcement.
1962 - Beginning September 17, presided over secret hearings held by a joint committee of the Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees to gain information on the Soviet threat to the United States posed by increased armament in Cuba. The resolution, produced by the committee and signed by President Kennedy on October 3, reaffirmed the Monroe Doctrine and gave the president authority to use any means necessary to stop the spread of communism in the Western hemisphere.
- Continued to fight against or block civil rights legislation in the Senate.
1963 - Appointed to the President's Commission on the Assassination of President Kennedy (commonly known as the Warren Commission).
- Voted against the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.
1964 - Led an active fight in Congress against the passage of the civil rights bill of 1964. However, upon the bill's passage through Congress and its receipt of President Johnson's signature on July 2, thus turning the measure into law, Russell urged compliance. He felt that above all citizens must obey the laws of the land and that obedience did not rest upon personal likes or dislikes.
- While Russell protested the United States' growing involvement in the Vietnamese Conflict, he felt it his duty to assure that United States troops were supplied with all necessary equipment and weaponry. To this end, Russell fought for increased military budgets throughout the conflict.
1966 - Early in the year Russell stated, in a White House conference regarding Vietnam, that the United States needed to drop its measured response of gradualism policies and instead fight to win. In May, for a U.S. News and World Report interview, Russell stated "go in and win-or get out."
1967 - Due to Russell's urgings over several years for additional protection for U.S. Army troops in Vietnam, the U.S. Navy announced that it would ready the battleship USS New Jersey for action along the coast of Vietnam.
1968 - In January, Russell celebrated thirty-five years service in the U.S. Senate, and was widely hailed as the only person to have spend half his life in the Senate.
- Supported and pushed through the Senate a bill for an antiballistic missile (ABM) system to be developed for national defense.
1969 - Appointed chairman of the Appropriations Committee and served until 1971.
- Elected President pro tempore of the Senate and served until 1971.
1971 - Death of Richard B. Russell, Jr. on January 21 at Walter Reed Hospital, Washington, DC, at 74 years of age. Russell lay in state in the State Capitol in Atlanta, Georgia, then was buried at the family cemetery in Winder, Georgia.
SUBJECT INDEX
The following alphabetical subject index refers only to series of manuscript materials located within the Richard B. Russell, Jr. Collection. While not complete, the list does provide a sampling of topics covered in the collection. For thorough research into any topic, please consider oral histories and Sub-Group E. Related Materials which includes photographs, audiovisual materials, and scrapbooks.
Aeronautical and Space Sciences -- General, Legislative, and Speech/Media
Agriculture (Georgia and National) -- Dictation, Early Office, General, Legislative, Speech/Media, and Winder
Agriculture and Forestry Commission -- Legislative and Winder
Anti-lynching legislation -- Civil Rights, Legislative, and Speech/Media
Appropriations Committee -- Legislative and Winder
Armed Forces, Segregation -- Civil Rights and Speech/Media
Armed Forces, Veterans -- Early Office and Legislative
Armed Services Committee -- Legislative and Winder
Atomic Energy Commission -- General and Legislative
Bloch, Charles J. -- Civil Rights, Political, Speech/Media and Winder
Cambodia -- International
Campaigns, Political (Gubernatorial - 1930) -- Dictation, Georgia Gubernatorial, and Winder
Campaigns, Political (Presidential - 1952) -- Dictation and Political
Campaigns, Political (U.S. Senate) -- Dictation, Early Office, Political, and Winder
China -- International and Speech/Media
Civil Defense -- General and Speech/Media
Civil Rights -- Civil Rights, Dictation, Political, Speech/Media, and Winder
Civil Works Administration -- Early Office
Cloture -- Civil Rights, Dictation, and Speech/Media
Cold War -- International, Legislative, Speech/Media, and Winder
Communism -- International and Speech/Media
Congo -- International and Speech/Media
Cuba -- International and Speech/Media
Cuban Missile Crisis, Oct. 1962 -- General (Red-line) and International,
County Unit System -- Political and Speech/Media
Dams, Harbors, and Rivers -- Rivers/Harbors and Speech/Media
Defense (U.S.) -- General, Legislative, Personal, and Speech/Media
Dominican Republic Crisis of 1965 -- International
Democratic National Convention -- Dictation and Political
Democratic -- Party Political, Speech/Media, and Winder
Democratic Policy Committee -- Legislative
Democratic Steering Committee -- Legislative
Electoral College -- General and Speech/Media
FENCE (Fair Employment Practices Committee) -- Civil Rights, Legislative, and Speech/Media
Faubus, Orval E. -- Civil Rights and Political
Filibuster (Political science) -- Civil Rights, Speech/Media and Winder
Foreign aid -- Dictation, General, Legislative, and Speech/Media
Foreign relations (U.S.) -- Dictation, General, International, Legislative, Speech/Media, and Winder
Georgia - Governors -- Early Office, Governor, Legislative, and Political
"Great Society" programs -- Civil Rights, General, Legislative, (Lyndon B. Johnson administration) and Speech/Media,
Griffin, S. Marvin -- Political and Speech/Media
Housing and Urban Development -- General and Speech/Media
Health, Education, and Welfare -- General and Legislative
Johnson, Lyndon B. -- Dictation, Intra-Office, Political, Speech/Media, and Winder
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy -- Legislative
Joint Committee on Reorganization of Congress -- Legislative
Kennedy, John F. -- Dictation, Intra-Office, Kennedy Assassinations, and Political
Kennedy, Robert F. -- Kennedy Assassinations
Korean Conflict -- Dictation and International
Ku Klux Klan -- Civil Rights and Winder
Labor Early Office, General, and Legislative
Lawrence, Alexander A Dictation and Political Patronage
Literary tests (Election law) Civil Rights and Speech/Media
Little Rock (Arkansas) Dictation, Civil Rights, and Winder
MacArthur, Douglas (Dismissal) MacArthur Hearings
Middle East International and Personal (trips)
Military Bases (Georgia) Dictation, Military Installations, and Speech/Media
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) -- Legislative and Speech/Media
New Deal, 1933-1939 -- Early Office and Speech/Media
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty-- General and Speech/Media
Panama Canal (Panama) -- General and Speech/Media
Patronage, Political Dictation, -- General, and Political Patronage
Poll tax -- Civil Rights, Dictation, and Speech/Media
Poverty Program -- General and Speech/Media
Prayer in the public schools -- Civil Rights, Dictation, and General
Pueblo Incident, 1968 -- International
Race Relations (Georgia and National) -- Civil Rights and Speech/Media
Reapportionment (Election law) -- General and Speech/Media
Roosevelt, Franklin Delano -- General and Winder
Rural Electrification Administration -- General, Legislative, and Speech/Media
Sanders, Carl E. -- Political and Speech/Media
Segregation (Georgia) -- Civil Rights, Dictation, and Speech/Media
School integration Civil Rights, Dictation, and Speech/Media
School lunch program Legislative and Speech/Media
Soil Conservation General, Legislative, and Speech/Media
Southern Manifesto Civil Rig
